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1 Introduction
Modern microeconomic theory seeks to ascribe individual decision-making
to well-behaved, axiomatic representations of preferences. However, it is
readily apparent that decision-making is context dependent. The manner in
which people perceive things through framing effects and other situational
variables has a drastic effect on their choices. It is possible to account for
such behavior through relaxation of the weak axiom of revealed preference,
through probabilistic methods of choice, and several other methods.
In this paper, we propose a model of intertemporal utility maximization
in which a decision-maker’s choices are influenced by a few key factors as
time passes. The decision-maker has ex ante preferences that are influenced
directly by the framing effect known as the ”attraction effect.” The attrac-
tion effect creates an initial distortion of the consumer’s preferences, and this
effect is ameliorated by the consumer’s ability to learn his true preferences as
time elapses. As time goes on further, the consumer begins to exhibit the ef-
fects described by Amos Tversky (1972) in his seminal work on the similarity
puzzle. The Tversky hypothesis proposes the polar opposite of the empir-
ically supported attraction effect. Ultimately, the decision-maker’s optimal
behavior in the context of the model will reflect the empirical observations
in these settings. Our main contribution is that we provide a model of utility
maximization that accounts for the decision-makers continuously evolving
preferences without relaxing the weak axiom or incorporating random choice
behavior.
2 Literature Review
The initial work on discrepancies between patterns in individual choice and
those predicted by seminal microeconomic theory can be attributed to Luce
(1959) and a subsequent response by Debreu (1960). In his paper, Luce
proposes a ”random choice hypothesis that claims:
The ratio between the probability with which option j is chosen
from a set of options to the probability with which k is chosen
from the same set is constant across all sets that contain j and k.
Luce uses this hypothesis to provide a model of random choice. However,
Debreu noted a key flaw in the design of Luce’s model. Debreu identified
what would come to be known as ”the duplicates problem.” Imagine a world
in which a decision-maker is indifferent between a train and a bus that hap-
pens to be blue. In this setting, the decision-maker chooses either with equal
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probability of one half. Suppose also that the decision-maker has no prefer-
ences over the color of a bus, so that he also is indifferent among riding a
blue bus or a yellow bus. Since the decision-maker is utterly indifferent with
respect to color, we should expect that he would still elect to ride the train
with probability one half should he be faced with these three options. But in
Luce’s model of random choice, his probability of selecting to ride the train
would be reduced to one third.
Debreu’s example can be considered extreme in some sense. People of
course have idiosyncratic preferences for minor details like color. Even so,
it does illustrate a drawback of the Luce model. It cannot account for the
manner in which decision-makers identify options as substitutes if not perfect
duplicates. In order to account for such behavior, famed behavioral research
Amos Tversky proposes in (1972b) what he refers to as the similarity hy-
pothesis:
The addition of an alternative to an offered set ‘hurts’ alternatives
that are similar to the added alternative more than those that are
dissimilar to it.
There are a number of ways to interpret this effect in the context of
choice behavior. It reflects the idea that a decision-maker’s preferences are
often independent of slight differences between options. It also has a more
psychological interpretation when compared to the attraction effect. The
attraction effect seems to occur because the pairing of similar options pro-
vides the decision-maker with a convenient point of comparison when one
is demonstrably better than another. Alternatively, the Tversky similarity
hypothesis paints a picture whereby similar options are associated together,
or categorized in some sense. In this light, an option that the decision-maker
originally deems fit for selection may seem weaker when he categorizes it as
similar to a significantly weaker one
Empirical evidence lends heavy support for the attraction effect. Experi-
ments originating back to Huber, Payne and Puto (1982) have all pointed to
the existence of the attraction effect in settings that include voting on polit-
ical candidates, financial investment and even medical decisions. It is plain
that the attraction effect and the Tversky similarity hypothesis are utterly
incompatible. Whereas the Tversky similarity hypothesis can be thought
of as a measure to account for a decision-maker’s psychological associations
while maintaining the well-behaved notion of preference monotonicity, the
observed attraction effect utterly shatters this idea. This is particularly prob-
lematic for random utility models that rely on the notion of monotonicity in
a probabilistic setting.
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The work of Gul, Natenzon and Pesendorfer (2012) and particularly
Natenzon (2010) features random choice models that can account for vio-
lations of monotonicity. Whereas previous models attribute the attraction
effect to a lapse in attentiveness or capability on the behalf of the decision-
maker, the Bayesian probit process described by Natenzon allows for the
existence of a decision-maker who is ultimately aware of his options. The
decision-maker makes inferences about his true utility by updating his beliefs
according to Bayes rule as time passes. In the scope of the Bayesian pro-
bit process, the capacity for learning is homogeneous across decision-makers.
Instead of having different learning rates, the precision of a decision-maker’s
information depends only on how much time has elapsed since the process
began. Information becomes arbitrarily precise as time tends to infinity. In
this model, learning can be endogenized so that a decision-maker’s optimal
behavior depends upon the amount of time it takes him to learn his prefer-
ences.
The Bayesian probit process also relies heavily on the notion of similarity.
In the context of that model, similarity rises according to the correlation
parameter of the standard Gaussian distribution. In this model, similarity is
simply determined by Euclidean distance. Bundles that are close together are
similar and vice versa. Similarity as correlation induces the attraction effect
in the early stages of the Bayesian probit process, since the decision-maker’s
ranking for similar options is much easier to discern. But as time passes,
the attraction effect diminishes entirely, giving way to the effects described
by Tversky’s similarity hypothesis. In the limit, Natenzon’s decision-maker
can discern perfectly between trains, green buses, and yellow buses as choice
probabilities converge to reflect the decision-maker’s indifference among these
options.
Another important recent paper that describes the attraction effect is
DeClippel and Eliaz (2012). These two took an entirely different approach
to explaining the attraction effect. The authors note that decision-making
occurs across a number of dimensions. To hearken back to the example
above, people may have preferences not only over types of transportation,
but over other facts like color or safety. They establish a model based on what
Tversky et al (1992, 1993) refer to as ”reason-based choice.” That is, choice
behavior may be explained as the decision-maker weighing various attributes
on the spot. DeClippel and Eliaz model this process as a cooperative dual-
selves bargaining model. In the scope of their model, the Nash bargaining
or “fallback” solution is the only axiomatic cooperative bargaining solution
that satisfies the necessary conditions for the attraction effect.
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3 Preliminary Examples
There are demonstrably a number of methods by which the attraction effect
can be explained. One reason for this is that there a plethora of exceptionally
clever people who work on these problems. Another is that because of the
idiosyncratic nature of human behavior and decision-making, there is no true
consensus on why the attraction effect occurs. This model will draw heav-
ily from the intuition of Natenzon (2010). The fact that decision-making
is often lengthy and quite costly lends credence to the idea that decision-
maker should be susceptible to the attraction effect early in the process. As
alluded to previously, this model will not use random utility maximization
or axiomatic bargaining to account for the attraction effect. Instead, the
decision-maker’s utility will be represented at different times as a sequence
of functions. In this setting, optimal behavior isn’t solely a function of the
precision of information, but it has a temporal element as well. The attrac-
tion effect is exhibited in many settings where intertemporal choice is relevant
to examine. For example, consider a student in an economics laboratory ex-
periment. While it is difficult to imagine that the student cares deeply about
the choices that he makes within the confines of the experiment, it is rather
easy to imagine that he has some preference for choosing “correctly,” even
if the marginal benefit of a correct decision is minimal. It is even easier to
imagine that the student wants to make the decision in a timely fashion in
order to substitute time spent in the lab for time doing just about anything
else.
In the model, most of the attention will be drawn to menus that are sub-
sets of R2. Traditionally, the attraction effect is observed in settings with
menus with 3 elements, and we will stick to this convention. I will present
a series of increasingly complex models that account for the attraction effect
by changing the decision-maker’s utility function in the presence of informa-
tion. Ex ante, the decision-maker has a well defined preference relation with
a continuous utility representation. In some sense, this is similar to the idea
of a random utility model in which the decision-maker’s true preferences are
unknown to the decision-maker. In that setting, preferences are inferred by
the decision-maker examining draws from a distribution and forming poste-
rior beliefs about his true utility. The example below can be thought of in
some sense as a naive process where the consumer undertakes one round of
updating and then makes a decision.
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4 Motivating Example (One)
There are an immense number of methods for describing consumer behavior
with regards to the attraction effect. Notably, through noncooperative dual
selves bargaining models and also by constructing random utility models. In
this example, we will examine the attraction effect in a different context.
Unlike the bargaining models, we focus on a single consumer. Unlike the
random utility maximization models, the consumer’s preferences are already
well known. However, as in the other models, this consumer will suffer from
the attraction effect because of the similarity between a maximal and an
inferior bundle.
The consumer’s rational preference relation  is a complete, transitive
binary relation on R2 (which can be thought of as different goods, or different
dimensions of one good, etc.) which is represented by a continuous, monotone
utility function U . In order to account for the attraction effect, we will endow
the consumer with additional utility based on the similarity between bundles
offered in a given menu. This additional utility is derived from the aptitude
with which similarity allows one to make a “correct” decision, particularly
in settings where acquiring precise knowledge by investing in information is
costly.
Let a menu M be a subset of R2 that contains 3 elements. We will ex-
amine such menus in order to isolate the attraction effect, which has been
demonstrated to occur in this setting. Since M is finite, it is compact. There-
fore, since U is continuous, U attains a maximum on M . Let d denote the
Euclidean metric on R2, i.e.
d(x, y) =
√
(x1 − y1)2 + (x2 − y2)2
Since M ⊂ R, M inherits the metric d. Additionally, d is continuous on
R2, and thus attains a minimum on M . It is this minimal distance that we
will examine below.
Example: Consider , U and d as above for a menu M := {A,B,C}
such that
A ∼ B  C
and therefore
U(A) = U(B) > U(C)
So that C(M) = A,B. Suppose further that
min{d(A,C), d(A,B)} ≥ d(B,C).
That is, B and C are closer together than any other pair of bundles in M .
In the classical sense of utility maximization, it is clear that the consumer
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can do so by randomizing between selecting A or B using any probability
distribution. In this model, when a consumer observes a menu, his utility is
mapped to a new utility function H : U(M)→ R where
H(U(x)) =
{
U(x) + 1
d(x,C)
if x ∈ {A,B}
U(x) if x = c
It is important to note that by convention, d(x, x) = 0 in any metric space.
We will restrict our attention to elements that were considered maximal
before the consumer’s utility function changes due to the presence of a bundle
that facilitates comparison, so H(C) = U(C) to preserve that ranking. This
aligns with the spirit of other attraction effect models. The addition of 1
d(x,y)
indicates the additional utility a consumer receives from having a point of
comparison. If we are to think of bundles that are“close” with respect to
the metric as having similar traits, then the closer an inferior bundle is to
a maximal bundle, the more accurate the comparison should be. The more
accurate the comparison, the more the consumer stands to gain. Since C
is inferior to both A and B, it should remain inferior. Traditionally, the
inclusion of C induces the consumer to select B from his choice set. The
inferior bundle C remains inferior.
Now, define U¯ : M → R as
U¯ := H(U(x))
As defined above, H is the sum of continuous functions, and is thus con-
tinuous. U is continuous by assumption. Hence U¯ is continuous, represents
a continuous rational preference relation ¯ and attains a maximum on M .
Since
d(A,C) ≥ d(B,C) ⇐⇒ 1
d(A,C)
≤ 1
d(B,C)
and
U(A) = U(B)
it is evident that
U¯(B) ≥ U¯(A)
and B is the unique element in C¯(M).
5 Motivating Example (Two)
The above example is, of course, primitive. It does account for the attraction
effect; once the list of alternatives is presented to the consumer, his choice
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behavior is affected by similarity. C is closer to B than to A and thus more
similar, and this is the driving force behind the change in utility. Since this
model is simplistic, there are few shortcomings. One is that, ideally, there
would be a way to map U(C) to another value. However, making U(C) a
fixed point is somewhat intuitive. There is no evidence from lab or field data
to support the notion that the utility the consumer derives from the initially
dominated option should change in any way. We can trust our consumer to
recognize its inferiority to the remaining options. There are other shortcom-
ings of this simple model. The most obvious one is that it ignores how the
consumer’s preferences will change over time. Since this is an analog to one
round of updating, we require an analogy to a random utility on an ordered
time set. We will accomplish this again by a device that maps the consumer’s
existing utility into a new set. One thing that random utility does not address
is the cost of decision-making. A random utility-maximizing agent simply
updates his beliefs about his preferences, and his information becomes more
precise as time tends to infinity. In this version of the model, the agent is
endowed with a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). As time passes, the consumer
discounts consumption. However, the consumer stands to gain from the pas-
sage of time in a different sense. As time passes, the consumer can better
learn about the alternatives that he faces. For the sake of simplicity, let the
ordered time set be N . We model the consumer’s preference for clarity and
more precise information as an increasing, continuously differentiable func-
tion f : N → R+. Adding to the model above, a general picture of what the
consumer’s preferences might look like in this setting is:
Ω(t, x) = δtf(t)H(x) = δtf(t)(U(x) +
1
d(x,C)
)
It may seem at first that this functional form accounts for the consumer’s
tradeoff between time and information, it isn’t entirely faithful to the spirit
of the attraction effect. It is easy to see that on any interval on which δtf(t)
is increasing, H(x) will scale Ω so that there is a wider gap between Ω(t, A)
and Ω(t, B). This effectively exacerbates the attraction effect. This can be
thought of as an analog to initial belief formation in which the consumer is
influenced by the focal bundle C. In order to maximize Ω, we can simply
examine the time dimension since H is maximized on a finite set (even though
Ω is multiplicatively seperable, there is no need to examine Hessians, etc. to
determine the nature of critical points). Let
y = arg max
x∈{A,B,C}
H(x)
Then
Ωt(t, y) = (δ
tf(t))′H(y) = (δt ln(δ)f(t)+δtf ′(t))H(y) = δtH(y)(f ′(t)+ln(δ)f(t))
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Since f is everywhere positive strictly increasing, f ′ is positive. So Ω is
increasing when
f ′(t)
f(t)
> − ln(δ)
and decreasing when
f ′(t)
f(t)
< − ln(δ)
Given the vagueness of the functional form, these inequalities seem a bit
trivial. But there are a wealth of functional forms for f that will induce Ω to
be either a) strictly decreasing, or b) increasing on [0, t0] and decreasing on
[t0,∞) for some critical t0. This is true of any polynomial of finite degree, any
exponential at such that δa ≤ 1, and a host of other deterministic functions
of t.
6 The Model
There are obvious drawbacks to the models presented above. While they are
comprised of well-behaved, differentiable functions, one key element to the
attraction effect is missing. An effective model should account not only for
the initial reversal of preferences, but also for how learning can smooth away
the initial reversal. In the limit, the models above will experience this to some
degree. Observe that when f is continuously differentiable and increasing on
R+
lim
t→∞
δtf(t)
d(x,C)
= 0.
But U experiences the same effect. Since this is the case, whichever
bundle from {A,B} maximizes H(x) will serve to maximize Ω ∀t. This is in
direct contrast with the Bayesian probit model presented in Natenzon (18,
2010), wherein he states:
Theorem 4 (Similarity Puzzle). If 1 ∼ 2 ∼ 3, then there are times T1,
T2 > 0 such that introducing 3 hurts 2 more than it hurts 1 for all times
before T1 , and the reverse occurs for all times greater than T2.
According to the Bayesian probit model, for early times the decision
maker is subject to the attraction effect. But as time goes on, the deci-
sion maker’s learning process is more aligned with the Tversky hypothesis.
The model I detailed above can do the former but not the latter. This version
will incorporate both the initial presence of the attraction effect as well as
the possibility of an ensuing preference reversal.
As above, the decision maker is endowed with a rational preference re-
lation  with continuous utility representation U over all possible options.
9
Let U−1 denote the level set of U , i.e. U−1 is the correspondence that maps
a utility level to the set of alternatives that provide the decision maker with
that level of utility. U−1B will denote the level set of B. The initial motivating
example will serve as a baseline for the following details and the correspond-
ing theorem. In this setting, the information provided to the decision-maker
by the inferior bundle will increase the utility of options near that bundle
through a continuous process. This continuous process will “stretch” the in-
difference curve of the option the decision maker is currently facing, mapping
it farther away from the origin so that its new utility is greater than or equal
to its previous utility. I will stick to the previous convention so that A  C
and B  C with d(B,C) the minimum distance between bundles. The rank-
ing of A and B will be left ambiguous. We define β¯(x, ) to be a closed ball
centered at x with radius epsilon. The continuous process is fleshed out by
the following theorem:
Theorem 1: h : U−1B ∩ β¯(B, d(B,C)) → Im(h) ⊆ ∂β¯(B, d(B,C)) is a
homeomorphism where
h(x) = x
d(B + (d(B,C), θ(x)), 0)
d(x, 0)
Some explanation is in order. (d(B,C), θ(x)) gives the polar coordinates of
a vector whose tail begins at B. The tip is at the point on the boundary of
β¯(B, d(B,C)) that lies on the ray that begins at 0 and passes through the
point x. That ray forms an angle ϕ with the horizontal axis, so ϕ (and by
extension x) will uniquely determine the angle θ(x) that this vector forms
with the horizontal.
The fact that h maps to Im(h) is essentially for convenience. There
really isn’t a convenient manner in which to state the set that h maps to, as
it will be different in each case. The image of h will consist of points along the
boundary of β¯(B, d(B,C)). There is no precise way to state what the set looks
like because of how drastically different it may look for different combinations
of utility functions and d(B,C) (it will vary in size, number of connected
components, etc.). Ultimately, h takes points along the indifference curve
given by U(B), and continuously deforms the curve by projecting the points
onto ∂β¯.
It is important to understand that it isn’t the indifference curve that is
changing per se. Indeed, if we are to simply change the indifference curve by
extending it farther from the origin, this makes every bundle contained in
U−1B ∩ β¯(B, d(B,C)) worse in some sense. The distortion could make these
options potentially unaffordable given the decision maker’s budget constraint,
and also this would create the crossing of indifference curves. Instead, the
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information provided by having closely related bundles induces the decision-
maker to assign greater utility to these alternatives. The decision-maker now
behaves as though any such bundle x lies along the indifference curve that
coincides with h(x).
But still, this only accounts for the initial attraction effect. The decision-
maker’s utility should smoothly return to the baseline level as time passes. In
the scope of random utility maximization, this is analogous to the decision-
maker’s beliefs converging to his true utility in the limit. However, it doesn’t
require a grand leap of faith to imagine a situation in which the decision-
maker can learn his true utility by some finite time t0. The following theorem
will illustrate this concept.
Theorem 2: Take h as above, and let I denote the identity map. Then
η : U−1B ∩ β¯(B, d(B,C))X[0, t0]→ R2 is a homotopy where
η(x, t) =
t0 − t
t0
h(x) +
t
t0
I(x) = η(x, t) =
t0 − t
t0
h(x) +
t
t0
x
t0 represents the amount of time it takes the decision-maker to learn his
true preferences. The process begins at t = 0, when the decision-maker views
M and experiences the initial attraction effect. As t→ t0, he assigns utility
levels to the bundles in U−1B ∩ β¯(B, d(B,C)) that more accurately reflect his
baseline preferences. At t = t0, the decision-maker’s bias towards B has been
eliminated, and utility levels are restored to reflect U .
This is a more elegant way of describing what is at stake in Part One. We
have obtained a well-behaved process by which the decision-maker’s utility
levels change near the “attracted” bundle B. However, in order to shift to
a model in which the decision-maker continuously discounts his utility as
time passes, there is one remaining facet we must describe. As it stands,
the homotopy η can create a reversal of preferences. However, in a model
with discounting it is plain to see that the only rational decision is to make
a selection at t = 0 of either A or B. After t = 0, the utility assigned to A
will decrease according to the discount rate δ. The utility assigned to B will
decrease according to both δ and η.
This is where Tversky’s similarity hypothesis enters the picture. Recall
that in (1972), Tversky posits that “the addition of an alternative to an
offered set ‘hurts’ alternatives that are similar to the added alternative more
than those that are dissimilar to it.” There is heuristic evidence that this
can occur, and Natenzon addresses this notion in the Bayesian probit model.
The logical sequence should look something like
1. The decision-maker views the menu M
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2. The decision-maker experiences the attraction effect
3. The decision-maker learns, and the attraction effect is subdued
4. The decision-maker begins to favor A.
The reason that item 4 occurs is unclear. A popular belief is that as time
passes, the decision-maker continues to associate the similar bundles B and
C. However, instead of looking better by comparison, the decision-maker’s
association makes B seem worse than it did before because of some kind of
mental compartmentalization. If we are to make sense of this notion in the
scope of this model, we can do so by exhibiting a continuous deformation
of U−1A . This should occur after the attraction effect has worn off. One can
easily imagine a setting in which the decision-maker’s utility is restored to
normal levels after the attraction effect for B has worn off, whereupon the
decision-maker begins to assign higher utility to A as it is starkly contrasted
with the associated bundles B and C. How much the utility of A improves
is closely related to the similarity (read: distance between) B and C. If C is
substantially worse than B but still similar enough to induce the attraction
effect, A should benefit more substantially when the decision-maker begins
to associate B and C together. Hence, the formulae for homeomorphism and
homotopy for U−1A will depend on the distance between B and C.
Theorem 3: 1) hA : U
−1
A ∩ β¯(A, d(B,C)) → Im(hA) ⊆ ∂β¯(A, d(B,C)) is a
homeomorphism where
hA(x) = x
d(A+ (d(B,C), θ(x)), 0)
d(x, 0)
2) ηA : U
−1
A ∩ β¯(A, d(B,C))X[t1, t2]→ R2 is a homotopy where
ηA(x, t) =
t− t1
t2 − t1hA(x) +
t2 − t
t2 − t1x
The proof of this theorem is entirely symmetric to the two preceding theo-
rems. It is logicial that the amount by which A improves is a function of the
similarity between B and C, but it also ensures that B will remain fixed ac-
cording to the second transformation. Since d(B,C) is the minimum distance
between any of the three bundles, A and B are at least d(B,C) apart. If it is
the unique minimum d(A,B) is of course greater, so A * U−1A ∩ β¯(B, d(B,C)
and vice versa. If d(A,B) = d(B,C), then A lies on ∂β¯(B, d(B,C)), and
remains fixed under h. The same is true of B and hA.
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I will now adopt some minor changes in notation. Denote h as hB, η as
ηB on [0, t1] instead of t0. The superscript t for each η denotes the value at
a given time. Additionally, we will define a family of functions
Ω(x, t) =

U(x) if x ∈ {A,C} and t ∈ [0, t1]
U(ηtB(B)) if t ∈ [0, t1]
U(ηtA(A)) if t ∈ [t1, t2]
U(hA(A)) if t ∈ [t2,∞)
U(x) if x ∈ {B,C} and t ∈ [t1, t2]
where t1 and t2 are given according to the preceding theorems. At t = 0, the
attraction effect occurs, and subsequently diminishes entirely by t1. Once
the attraction effect subsides, the decision-maker perceives A to look better
than it previously did, and this effect occurs until some threshold t2. Given
these effects, we will now examine the decision-maker’s optimal behavior.
The decision-maker will discount exponentially according to δ ∈ [0, 1]. In
this setting the exponential discount rate can be thought of as “the cost
of thinking,” with lower levels of δ corresponding to smaller costs and vice
versa.
Theorem 4: The solution to the maximization problem
max
x∈{A,B.C},t∈[0,∞)
e−δtΩ(x, t)
is one of
1. (B, 0)
2. (A, 0)
3. (A, τ) for some τ ∈ [t1, t2]
This theorem accounts for both the initial attraction effect and the ensuing
Tversky effect, and these results align with empirics. Impatient people who
are especially sensitive to the effect will select B from the outset. If A
is drastically better than B, then not even the attraction effect can sway
someone’s decision. Additonally, the more patient and/or faster learning
decision-makers can hold out to consume A when it becomes an even more
viable option. These are precisely the decisions that we witness in empirical
examples and laboratory settings.
Example 1: Consider the utility function U(x) = ln(x1) + ln(x2). Take
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A = (e, 0), B = (0, e) and C = (0, e
2
). It is elementary to check that
d(B,C) = e
2
is the minimum distance between bundles on M. Hence,
U(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ {A,B}
1− ln(2) if x = C
We will set t1 = 1 and t2 = 2. At t = 0:
e0Ω(B, 0) = U(hB(B)) = U(B
(B + d(B,C))
d(B, 0
) = U((0, e+
e
2
)) = ln(
3e
2
)
e0Ω(A, 0) = U(A) = 1
At t1 = 1:
e−δΩ(B, 1) = e−δU(B) = e−δ
e−δΩ(A, 1) = e−δU(A) = e−δ
At t2 = 2:
e−2δΩ(B, 2) = e−δU(B) = e−2δ
e−2δΩ(A, 1) = e−δU(hA(A)) = e−2δ ln(
3e
2
)
It is easy to verify that the solution to the maximization problem is (B, 0).
This is akin to “Motivating Example One” in some sense. The options are
considered equal at first, and so hA and hB will have identical effects. Since
utility is discounted, the attraction effect occurs.
Example 2: Once again, consider the utility function U(x) = ln(x1)+ln(x2).
Take A = (4e
3
, 0), B = (0, e) and C = (0, e
2
) so that d(B,C) is the minimum
distance. Again, take t1 = 1 and t2 = 2. At t = 0:
e0Ω(B, 0) = U(hB(B)) = U(B
(B + d(B,C))
d(B, 0
) = U((0, e+
e
2
)) = ln(
3e
2
)
e0Ω(A, 0) = U(A) = ln(
4e
3
)
At t1 = 1:
e−δΩ(B, 1) = e−δU(B) = e−δ
e−δΩ(A, 1) = e−δU(A) = e−δ ln(
4e
3
)
At t2 = 2:
e−2δΩ(B, 2) = e−δU(B) = e−2δ
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e−2δΩ(A, 1) = e−δU(hA(A)) = e−2δ ln(
4e
3
+
e
2
) = e−2δ ln(
11e
6
)
In general, we can examine the behavior of e−δtΩ(A, t) on [t1, t2] by use of
the intermediate value and max-min theorems. For the moment, we will only
make use of the latter. We can guarantee that the decision-maker’s utility
maximizing pair will occur on [t1, t2] as long as
e−2δ ln(
11e
6
) ≥ ln(3e
2
) ⇐⇒ e−2δ ≥ ln(
3e
2
)
ln(11e
6
)
≈ .67
⇐⇒ −2δ ' −.4 ⇐⇒ δ / .2
For such values of δ, waiting until t2 = 2 to consume is at least as good as
picking B from the outset. Hence, the maximum on [t1, t2] is the optimal
selection. Note also that it is possible that larger values of δ will feature
a solution of the form (A, τ) for τ ∈ [t1, t2]; establishing such values would
require an exhaustive solution.
This example also displays the preference reversals that this model can
account for across time periods. According to the baseline preferences, A is
the superior option. But when faced with a menu M , the decision-maker is
influenced by a framing effect and is subjected to the attraction effect. As
the decision-maker learns, his preferences return to the baseline level. But
by t1 = 1, utility has been discounted as the decision-maker has devoted a
nontrivial amount of time to discerning his tastes. After t1, the decision-
maker’s preferences begin to evolve again as A becomes favored relative to B
and C even more than it was initially. At some time in [t1, t2] the decision-
maker will pick an optimal stopping time and select A whenever his discount
factor δ satisfies the given inequality, though there are presumably greater
discount factors for which this is also the case.
7 Conclusion
We have presented an attraction effect model that incorporates many facets of
the existing literature. Whereas other models rely on concepts like axiomatic
bargaining or random utility maximization, this model provides a process by
which a decision-maker’s preferences change continuously as time elapses.
A decision-maker who is equipped with a rational preference relation and
continuous utility representation is presented with a choice set that features
3 elements, including a strictly dominated option. Initially, the decision-
maker assigns higher utility to the “attracted” bundle until he has a sufficient
amount of time to learn his true preferences. At that time, the decision-
maker begins to exhibit the effect described in the Tversky hypothesis. A
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logical explanation is that the decision-maker begins to associate the similar
bundles in a negative light, which makes the remaining option look better
by comparison. The decision-maker faces a dynamic optimization problem
subject to a tradeoff between how his preferences change continuously in time
and how he discounts future consumption. The solutions to the optimization
problem coincide with an outcome that reflects either the attraction effect
or the Tversky hypothesis, and the outcome is determined by the decision-
maker’s capacity for patience and effective learning.
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: First, note that U−1x is closed ∀x. Take x ∈ S =
{y ∈ R2|U(y) = α}. Since the kernel of any continuous function is closed,
Ker(U(x) − α) is closed. But this just yields the set S, so S is closed.
Additionally, β¯(B, ) is closed by definition. Hence, U−1B ∩ β¯(B, ) is an inter-
section of closed sets, and is thus closed. Also, this intersection is contained
in β¯(B, ). Hence U−1B ∩ β¯(B, ) is a closed, bounded subset of R2, and is
thus compact. Consider the function
h(x) = x
d(B + (d(B,C), θ(x)), 0)
d(x, 0)
This function is the product of the identity function and the ratio of two
distance functions, all of which are continuous. Hence, h is continuous. We
will now show that h is injective
x = y ⇐⇒ x
d(x, 0)
=
y
d(y, 0)
⇐⇒ xd(B + (d(B,C), θ(x)), 0)
d(x, 0)
= y
d(B + (d(B,C), θ(y)), 0)
d(y, 0)
⇐⇒ h(x) = h(y)
Since the space that h maps to is Im(h), it is surjective by definition. So
h is both injective and surjective, and therefore bijective. Finally, note that
Im(H) is a subspace of R2, which features the standard topology according
to d. Since R2 is Hausdorff, any subspace of R2 with the subspace topology
is also Hausdorff. Since h is a continuous bijection from a compact set to
Im(h), a Hausdorff space, h is a homeomorphism.
Proof of Theorem 2: As shown in the proof of theorem 1, h is a continuous
function on R2. Additionally, the identity function is continuous on R2. The
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functions t
t0
and t0−t
t0
are ratios of linear functions, and are thus continuous.
Then the restriction map ητ : [0, t0]→ R2 given by
t0 − τ
t0
h(x) +
τ
t0
x
is continuous ∀τ ∈ [0, t0] and any x on which h is defined. Hence, η
satisfies the continuity conditions for homotopy.
Proof of Theorem 3: 1) As shown above, U−1A ∩β¯(A, ) is a compact subset
of R2.. Additionally,
hA(x) = x
d(A+ (d(A,C), θ(x)), 0)
d(x, 0)
is a continuous bijection as shown in theorem 1. Since hA is a continuous
bijection from R2 to Im(H), a Hausdorff subspace of R2, hA is a homeomor-
phism.
2) Since hA and the identity function are both continuous on R2, and the
functions t−t1
t2−t1 and
t2−t
t2−t1 are continuous on [t1, t2], we observe that the re-
striction map ητA : [t1, t2]→ R2 given by
τ − t1
t2 − t1h(x) +
t2 − τ
t2 − t1x
is continuous ∀τ ∈ [t1, t2] and any x on which hA is defined. Hence, ηA
satisfies the continuity conditions for homotopy.
Proof of Theorem 4: i)Let V (x, t) = e−δtΩ(x, t). First we will show that
V is continuous before proving the brunt of the theorem in ii). Since e−δt
is continuous ∀t, it will be sufficient to check the continuity of Ω. It will be
convenient to itemize the continuity conditions as follows:
1. Since Ω(A, t) is constant on [0, t1] and also on [t2,∞) and Ω(B, t) and
Ω(C, t) are constant on [t1,∞), Ω is continuous on these intervals for
each value.
2. As proven in Theorem 2, ηB is continuous on B × [0, t1], and ηA is
continuous on A× [t1, t2].
The last condition we must check are for the endpoints of each interval.
However, it is easy to see that
lim
t→t+1
Ω(B, t) = lim
t→t+1
U(ηtB(B)) = U( lim
t→t+1
t1 − t
t1
h(B) +
t
t1
B) = U(B)
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= lim
t→t−1
U(B) = lim
t→t−1
Ω(B, t)
Similarly,
lim
t→t−2
Ω(A, t) = lim
t→t−2
U(ηtA(A)) = U( lim
t→t−2
t− t1
t2 − t1hA(A) +
t2 − t
t2 − t1A) = U(hA(A)
= lim
t→t+2
U(hA(A)) = lim
t→t+2
Ω(B, t)
Since we have examined the conditions for each point in {A,B,C}, we con-
clude that Ω(x, t) is continuous on {A,B,C} × [0,∞).
ii) First, note that U(hA(A)) = U(η
t2
A (A)). Then ∀t > t2,
e−δt2 > e−δt ⇒ e−δt2Ω(A, t2) > e−δtΩ(A, t)⇒ V (A, t2) > V (A, t)
It is clear that this is also true for bundles B and C. So a maximum most
occur on [0, t2]. Additionally, [0, t2] = [0, t1]∪ [t1, t2]. So, we can examine the
maximum on each of these compact subintervals, and take the maximum of
these extremal values. The existence of each is guaranteed by the compact-
ness of the intervals and the continuity of V . Recall that by assumption,
V (C, t) < V (x, t) where x ∈ {A,B} and ∀t. We will first examine [0, t1].
∀t ∈ [0, t1] such that t 6= 0,
e0 = 1 > e−δt ⇒ V (B, 0) > V (B, t) AND V (A, 0) > V (A, t)
If V (A, 0) ≥ V (B, 0),
⇒ V (A, 0) > V (A, t) AND V (A, 0) > V (B, t)
If V (B, 0) ≥ V (A, 0),
⇒ V (B, 0) > V (A, t) AND V (B, 0) > V (B, t)
Hence, the maximum on [0, t1] is an element of {V (A, 0), V (B, 0)}.
We now move to [t1, t2]. By an argument symmetric to the one above,
we have V (B, t1) > V (B, t) ∀t > t1. Additionally, the function V (A, t)
is continuous on [t1, t2]. Thus, ∃τ ∈ [t1, t2] such that V (A, τ) ≥ V (A, t)
∀t ∈ [t1, t2]. If V (B, t1) ≥ V (A, τ)
⇒ V (B, 0) > V (B, t1) ≥ V (A, τ)
and therefore the maximum on [0, t2] is an element of {V (A, 0), V (B, 0)}. If
V (A, τ) ≥ V (B, t1), then V (X, t) attains its maximum on [t1, t2] at V (A, τ).
Then
max
x∈{A,B.C},t∈[0,∞)
V (x, t) = max{ max
x∈{A,B.C},t∈[0,t1]
V (x, t), max
x∈{A,B.C},t∈[t1,t2]
V (x, t)}
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= max{V (A, τ),max{V (A, 0), V (B, 0)}}
which is plainly an element of {V (A, τ), V (A, 0), V (B, 0)}.
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